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Thomas Pradeu’s The Limits of the Self provides a precise account of biological
identity developed from the central concepts of immunology. Yet the central
concepts most relevant to this task (self and nonself ) are themselves deemed
inadequate, suffering from ambiguity and imprecision. Pradeu seeks to remedy this
by proposing a new guiding theory for immunology, the continuity theory. From
this, an account of biological identity is provided in terms of uniqueness and
individuality, ultimately leading to a defense of the heterogeneous organism as
expressing the highest degree of individuality.
Organisms are under attack. Pathogens, environmental stress, and endogenous factors,
among many others, threaten the survival of an organism. To persist, organisms must
be able to mount an effective response, and a variety of strategies for regulating these
stressors have evolved. Collectively, these are the immune system.
The organism is also under attack as a scientific concept. Samir Okasha (2011) has
argued that organism is an anachronistic hierarchical rank, and that we should abandon
this vestige of classification in favor of a rank-free ecological hierarchy. I have argued
for a neighboring view (Haber 2013), observing that the term organism, much like
species, is used to refer to a disparate group of entities, and that we ought to follow the
lead of species eliminativists like Marc Ereshefsky (1992) and Brent Mishler (1999) and
‘get rid of organisms’.
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concerns both of these attacks. He proposes a new theory of immunology, the continuity
theory, arguing it ought to replace existing theoretical frameworks in that field. From
this, he develops a spirited defense of the organism as occupying a unique and
theoretically relevant place in biology, providing a precise account of the organism as a
heterogeneous entity expressing the highest degree of individuality.
Yet that does not quite do justice to Pradeu’s book. Indeed, I think it embodies what
philosophy of biology both has done well and should aspire to be. To draw this out, I
will evaluate Pradeu’s book along four dimensions, corresponding to what I view as
four central projects in philosophy of biology: (1) identifying core commitments of
biologists; (2) participating in conceptual debates in biology; (3) acting as science critics
to help biologists; and (4) drawing on biology for philosophy.
The central task Pradeu sets himself is to provide a precise account of biological
identity. His introductory chapter lays this out as two distinct problems, of uniqueness
and individuality, warning against conflating the two. The former is presented as the
question of what makes two entities different from one another, the latter a problem of
delineation. Being distinctively unique means to have a character that no other entity
has, e.g., a unique genome. Being a distinct individual, on the other hand, means
having separate boundaries from other individuals, though other individuals may not
be unique, e.g., monozygotic twins may be distinct individuals, despite not having
unique genomes.
Immunology, Pradeu argues, can inform both of these problems of identity. There is
vast diversity latent in immune systems, both at the immunogenetic level (in terms of
genetic variation, recombination, and polymorphisms), and at the phenotypic level (e.g.,
in the proteins expressed by immune cells). Moreover, in organisms with adaptive
immune systems, uniqueness will, in part, be constructed over time in relation to the
antigens encountered by the organism. Thus the immune system is an active molecular
record of the unique spatiotemporal location of different individuals. So, Pradeu
concludes, “immune components are therefore one of the most convincing
manifestations of each organism’s uniqueness” (p. 7).
Pradeu, however, is primarily concerned with the immune system’s role in
individuation, both as it delineates the boundaries of organisms and in how it marks
organisms as expressing the highest degree of biological individuality. Thus chapter 1,
”Immunology, Self and Nonself,” stakes out Pradeu’s project. Immunology is
characterized as including the study of biological identity, yet the central
immunological concepts that appear most relevant for this task (self and nonself ) are
deemed inadequate, suffering from ambiguity and imprecision—Pradeu identifies five
different meanings, though it is not always clear which of these immunologists are
using. To be of use in our goal of specifying individuation conditions for organisms,
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comprises the central task of the next four chapters.
In chapter 1 we get a definition of immunology, how that definition entails that all
organisms have an immune system (supported by experimental cases drawn from
vertebrate, invertebrate, plant, and microbial studies), and an initial account of the
terms self and nonself as used in immunology. Pradeu defines immunology in terms of
molecular reactions: immunology is “the discipline that studies specific interactions
between immune receptors and antigenic patterns (ligands), interactions that can
trigger mechanisms that destroy or prevent the destruction of target antigens” (p. 19).
This is a departure from traditional definitions, which, loosely speaking, task
immunology with studying the immune system as the variety of systems and strategies
that evolved to respond to the stressors an organism might encounter (one member of
our reading group preferred calling it “the ultimate kludge job”).
Pradeu’s molecular definition carries surprising consequences, simultaneously
broadening and narrowing the scope of the field. Plants, invertebrates, and even
microbes, on Pradeu’s definition, have immune systems. This nicely corresponds to
recent molecular work in the field, and powerfully unifies a diverse set of phenomena
across a broad phylogenetic scope. More boldly, the theory predicts these (and as yet
undetected cases), rather than needing to account for them after the fact.
The taxonomy of objects under study by immunologists is not merely expanded, but
revised. For example, the relevance of ‘specific’ versus ‘nonspecific’ immunity is greatly
reduced: “There is immunity, properly speaking, only when there is a biochemically
specific reaction between an antigen (ligand) and receptors carried by the immune
system’s actors. Consequently, in my conception, the traditional distinction between
‘specific’ and ‘nonspecific’ immunity loses its relevance” (p. 20). Entities that were
previously classified as distinct kinds of immunological actors fall under Pradeu’s
unified definition. Specificity is simply a matter of scope, a measure of the ubiquity of
an antigenic (molecular) pattern. Nonspecific actors simply react to specific patterns
that are widespread in nature.
Other traditional components of the ‘nonspecific’ system get left out of the domain of
immunology on Pradeu’s definition. Physical and mechanical boundaries such as
epithelial tissue, respiratory mucous, or cell walls, on Pradeu’s definition, are not parts
of the immune system because their interaction with antigens is not biochemically
specific. Jettisoning these components from the domain of immunology is a tradeoff,
though one that Pradeu moves over rather quickly. There is no substantive discussion of
the costs of jettisoning these components from the field, though this may mark a radical
departure for many immunologists.
The thin treatment of possible objections reflects what I think is the biggest weakness of
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replace immunology’s specific/nonspecific classification with a
molecular/non-molecular one? Pradeu provides the resources for offering principled
reasons here (e.g., it would be too imprecise, or would undermine a unified application
of the continuity theory), but relies on readers to make these connections. Some of this
may be chalked up to Pradeu remaining focused on building a positive case for his
view. So though the arguments would be strengthened at times by addressing concerns
and counterarguments, avoiding these may simply reflect a methodological or strategic
choice. The tight focus has its own benefits in providing clear and coherent
arguments.
It is worth pausing to commend Pradeu on how clearly he lays out the field of
immunology. The central concepts and arguments are complicated and driven by
empirical details, requiring Pradeu to carefully spend time harnessing experimental
results to make his case. This can be a challenge to the reader, yet he does this with
extraordinary clarity, which goes a long way towards making those arguments
accessible even to those less familiar with the field. This is all the more important for a
field like immunology, which is driven as much by experimental details as by theory—a
situation that Pradeu seeks to remedy. This also displays the value of carefully
identifying the core commitments of a field, be they conceptual, experimental,
ontological, methodological, or what have you. Pradeu’s definition of immunology is
not without controversy, but it is well-motivated and usefully advances the
discussion.
The core commitments of biologists may also be characterized in terms of the research
problems and projects they generate, and in how these subsequently shape a field. This
is on clear display in chapters 2, “The Self-Nonself Theory” and 3, “Critique of the
Self-Nonself Theory,” which provide descriptions of the foundations of the self-nonself
theory and Pradeu’s argument for why this theory is now inadequate, respectively. As
in chapter 1, these are driven by a careful attention to experimental results and
empirical data.
The self-nonself theory is attributed to Frank Burnet. Although earlier immunologists
employed the terms ‘self’ and ‘nonself’, it is Burnet’s usage that marks how these
concepts are now employed. He treated the organism’s differentiation of self from
nonself as a scientific problem in itself; as something to be explained, rather than as a
self-evident starting point in immunology. This not only provided central guiding
principles for immunologists, but also a central guiding research problem, i.e., it
demanded that researchers answer the question of how an organism’s immune system
comes to recognize what is self and nonself. On this theory that distinction corresponds
to the endogenous or exogenous origin of the antigen. This, in turn, provides a means
of answering what Pradeu takes to be the central problem in immunology: determining
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triggered.
Burnet’s self-nonself theory of immunology generated a deeply fruitful and successful
research program. Yet it also produced experimental data that Pradeu argues is
inadequately explained by the self-nonself theory. These have accumulated to the point
of undermining the self-nonself criterion of immunogenicity, with the most compelling
being cases of autoreactivity (reaction to ‘self’) and immunotolerance (absence of
response to ‘nonself’). The picture Pradeu paints is of a field left without a central
guiding theory, instead relying on a collection of imprecise and vague concepts. Pradeu
argues that this is bad for immunology, and that it will be more fruitful and productive
with a new guiding theory.
Here we see Pradeu as the science critic. Much as a good film critic can help filmmakers
make a better movie, philosophers of science help scientists practice better science.1
This can take on a social aspect when philosophers identify (implicit or explicit) biases
in scientific studies, noting how these may constrain, undermine, or distort the
conclusions being drawn (see Lloyd 2001 or Richardson 2010 for exemplars par
excellence). Or it can take the form of identifying what makes a particular case study a
good or bad model of scientific reasoning, and what ought to be emulated (or not) of
that study.
In The Limits of the Self this latter critical project is a subtle yet persistent and important
theme of the book, defending the importance of a central guiding theory, or “organized
set of testable explanatory and predictive statements,” (Pradeu et al 2013, p. 765, box 1,
where this argument is placed more front and center). As the self-nonself framework
has been criticized in immunology, no general theoretical framing has emerged as a
replacement. The problem, as Pradeu frames it, is that this leaves the field without
unified guiding principles or research problems, and, more worryingly, without the
resources to provide unified explanations of seemingly disparate data. Operating in the
context of a guiding theory produces better science.
Perhaps valuing guiding theories this way sounds trivial, but it is not—especially for
molecular and developmental fields of biology, where it is not obvious that there are
always guiding theories (or that they are needed, or must be true to be useful, or would
generate fruitful productivity; see Fagan 2013). This discussion takes place a bit in the
background, and Pradeu’s argument is one of demonstration. It is also compelling, and
deserves to be taken seriously by critics of a theory-driven conception of science.
In chapter 4, “The Continuity Theory,” Pradeu shifts from identifying the commitments
of a field to actively participating in disputes over them, arguing that continuity theory
should serve as immunology’s guiding theory. First proposed by Pradeu and Carosella
1Credit for this goes to David Magnus, who described the philosopher-as-science-critic this way in my
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(2006a,b), the continuity theory holds that the criterion of immunogenicity—why and
when an immune system is triggered—is the abrupt presence of novel antigens.
Contrary to the self-nonself criterion of immunogenicity, whether these antigens are of
exogenous or endogenous origin is irrelevant. This seemingly simple proposal carries
substantial consequences. It offers a unified approach to a variety of features of
immunological systems across a wide phylogenetic scope that are difficult to reconcile
on the self-nonself theory, e.g., immunotolerance of exogenous antigens and
autoreactivity. It generates a new set of research problems for immunologists to study,
and a variety strategies for pursuing these that are obscured by a self-nonself
framework.
The case Pradeu makes for the continuity theory is compelling, and the theory holds
many attractions. For one, it demystifies the self-nonself distinction by articulating
immunogenicity in clear molecular and mechanistic terms. It is also easy to reconcile
with a view of the immune system as a regulatory system primarily concerned with
maintaining homeostasis. This nicely coincides with an evolutionary treatment of these
systems, yet firmly grounds immunology in developmental and molecular biology. And
though the immune system is defined in terms of biochemical reactions, this is not a
naïve reductionist account. To the contrary, Pradeu should be read as reviving what he
identifies as an early commitment of the field that treats the organism more as an
ecological whole rather than in terms of genomic expression (aligning himself with
Burnet’s earlier work).
Not only is Pradeu’s case compelling, but there is evidence that the continuity theory is
being taken up by immunologists: Elizabeth Jaffee appeals to it in order to explain what
determines tumor immunogencitity (Blankenstein et al 2012); Hodge et al (2013) adopt
the “criterion of continuity (CC)” as their definition of immunogenicity, “where
immune cells respond to abrupt modifications of the antigenic patterns with which they
are in contact” (p. 633, attributing this definition to Pradeu and Carosella 2006a); and
Grignolio et al (2014) seek to incorporate it in their extension of the danger theory in
their proposal of the ‘liquid self’ (though I would think this would be resisted by
Pradeu). At the very least it appears that immunologists are taking the continuity
theory very seriously, which means we philosophers ought to as well.
This advocacy continues into chapter 5, “Comparing the Continuity Theory to Other
Immunological Theories,” where Pradeu considers his view against competing theories.
The most prominent of these is Polly Matzinger’s danger theory (1994), which
proposes, like the continuity theory, that it is not self-nonself recognition that generates
an immune response, but danger (or, perhaps, damage). Pradeu identifies several
problems with this theory, among them that ‘danger’ is both imprecise and ambiguous,
and too anthropomorphic. Replacing it with ‘damage’ adds (some) precision, yet
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resources for explaining why and when an immune response is triggered. Pradeu also
worries that danger theory retains the parts of self-nonself theory that are inadequate
(e.g., its “endogenous logic” p. 217), while rejecting those that should be retained (e.g.,
a criterion of immunogenicity).
Despite devoting just under half the chapter to danger theory, discussion of it feels a bit
thin compared to the deep treatment offered of the self-nonself theory. This is
exacerbated by the absence of any discussion of DAMPs (Danger or
Damage-Associated-Molecular-Patterns), which, at first pass, appear to provide an
avenue for the danger theorist to defend their account against some of Pradeu’s
complaints.2 Let’s look at this in more detail.
Much as Pradeu defines the immune system in terms of molecular reactions between
antigens and immune receptors, the danger theorist might do so in terms of
biochemical reactions triggered by DAMPs. Danger, then, could be defined
immunologically as the presence of these molecular patterns. Indeed, there are good
empirical data supporting this in immune responses to both the endogenous (e.g.,
necroptosis of dying cells, [Kono and Rock 2008; Kaczmarek et al 2013]) and exogenous
(e.g., fungal and bacterial pathogens in Drosophila [Chamy et al 2008]). Identification of
DAMPs in various contexts, and when and whether reactions with these subsequently
generate an immune response then become two of the central research problems for the
danger theorist, providing a foundation for a rich research program.
This is not to say Pradeu does not have good arguments available to address this sort of
response. Rather it is to observe that they are not on offer here, and that strikes me as a
missed opportunity to expand the case for the continuity theory. For example, Pradeu
might argue that a characterization of danger theory in terms of DAMPs is still
empirically inadequate; or is narrower in scope than the continuity theory, which can
offer a broader, unified account of phenomena that danger theory leaves unanswered;
or that DAMPs are a feature of the immune system, rather than defining of them (some
of these, and other more detailed responses, are in Pradeu and Cooper 2012).
Pradeu might have also argued that continuity theory subsumes danger theory. On a
continuity account, there is nothing intrinsic about DAMPs that signal danger or
damage, it is only by virtue of their abrupt novelty that an immune system response is
triggered. Indeed, we should expect that organisms would have evolved some means of
triggering the immune system, and the ability of cells to quickly produce novel antigens
to signal homeostatic disruption or severe stress would be evolutionarily advantageous.
There are experimental data supporting this, as at least some DAMPs appear to be
functional intracellular proteins that, when released outside the cell upon tissue injury,
become denatured, presenting as novel antigens (Rubartelli and Lotze 2007).
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Furthermore, the continuity theory predicts that organisms should become acclimated
to DAMPs if introduced gradually, repeatedly, and in small quantities (Pradeu 2012,
p. 180, and elsewhere), whereas on the danger theory DAMPs should trigger a response
regardless of mode of introduction. Framed this way, experiments to test between the
theories can be imagined rather easily, e.g., early exposure to DAMPs may result in
downstream failures of these to generate an immune response. This could also provide
a means of explanation for any number of diseases, especially chronic late-onset
conditions in which the immune system appears to fail to respond.
These five chapters culminate in the ambitious chapter 6, “What is An Organism?
Immunity and the Individuality of the Organism,” which returns to the overarching
topic: the problem of biological identity. Pradeu describes how his conception of
immunology distinctively marks organisms as heterogeneous entities expressing the
highest degree of individuality, how this subsequently challenges and enriches
entrenched views in philosophy of biology, and stakes out important methodological
challenges. Each is a substantial contribution worth reviewing. Let’s start with the
last.
Pradeu is far from the first philosopher to tackle the problem of identity—about living
things or otherwise. What’s distinctive is how he prioritizes experimental and
theoretical support from the sciences to both frame and answer the critical questions at
stake. His first move, after all, is to mine immunology for metaphysical insights. He
identifies this approach as scientific metaphysics, (aligning himself with Ladyman and
Ross 2007), seeing it as a straight-forward challenge to traditional philosophy: “Despite
a long philosophical tradition that demands a total separation between ontology or
metaphysics and experimental science, the link between the two seems to me close”
(p. 220). In practice this means identifying the metaphysical commitments in our
sciences, and to recognize that sometimes scientific theories are also philosophical ones.
It might be tempting to simply call this naturalism, something like a demand that our
metaphysical theories conform to our best science, and see it as relatively
uncontroversial. After all, it seems that almost everyone today is a naturalist in this
regard. Yet what Pradeu demands is a greater rigor than what many naturalists appear
to aspire. Superficial engagement with the sciences is viewed as merely a cover, and
insufficient for good metaphysics.
For philosophers of biology, scientific metaphysics should be familiar ground (even if
we don’t always call it such). Pradeu rightly notes that there is a strong tradition in
philosophy of biology of identifying the metaphysical consequences of evolutionary
theory, and considering how metaphysics both impacts and is informed by
experimental work. Pradeu seeks to extend this project to include physiology and
molecular biology, by “showing to what extent immunology clarifies the metaphysical
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the level of precision, empirical detail, experimental sensitivity and sophisticated
engagement with science that we should expect of our metaphysical theories.
Simultaneously, Pradeu is making a methodological plea to philosophers of biology to
develop the field beyond a focus on evolutionary theory, reminiscent of O’Malley and
Dupré’s (2007) call for a more inclusive philosophy of biology that includes
microbiology. Pradeu is extending that call, demonstrating how physiological and
molecular fields—relatively underexamined by philosophers of biology—uniquely
enrich, challenge, and add to our existing views.
Philosophers of biology, I think, are receptive this plea. The call for a more inclusive
approach is a challenge that, in important ways, aligns well with the interests of those
being challenged; whether and how fields of biology beyond evolutionary theory
inform and conform to existing work in philosophy of biology reflects a natural growth
of our field.3 My sense is that there is enthusiasm for work that branches out beyond
the traditional focus, especially as scholars like Pradeu demonstrate how fruitful that
may be. Graduate students seeking to make unique and meaningful contributions
would do well to pay attention!
More resistance is likely in his call for scientific metaphysics. On the one hand, this is a
challenge to contemporary metaphysics. It is not merely a charge of being too narrow,
but of doing it wrong. It demands a highly sophisticated engagement with the sciences
that few practice or have the training for. Yet it is also a challenge to philosophers of
science resistant to doing metaphysics. It demands that those philosophers who are
scientifically literate identify the metaphysical commitments in the sciences, and the
perspectives that these bring to philosophy. In short, that we bridge the gap between
the experimental sciences and metaphysics.
Yet Pradeu is not merely telling us how to draw on science for philosophy, he shows us
as well. He treats the problem of identity as two distinct questions: that of uniqueness
and individuality, and shows us how continuity theory enriches our conception of both.
The immune system constructs a unique identity and delineates the boundaries of
organisms. Replacing the self-nonself criterion of immunogenicity with one of
continuity means that both endogenous and exogenous entities will be parts of these
living things, adding a heterogeneous dimension to how both uniqueness and
individuality are expressed. Furthermore, the immune system is offered as part of the
developmental system, “of the processes that build the living thing over time” (p. 225).
This means that both uniqueness and individuality—and, thus, identity—will be
expressed diachronically, come in degrees, and become more pronounced as a living
thing persists. Moreover, Pradeu identifies work from immunology, microbiology, and
3Perhaps the focus on evolution is partly due to a founder effect. Imagine how our field might look had
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developmental biology that corresponds to this heterogeneous approach (p. 248),
though this usage is even broader than he indicates. Human genomicists, for example,
are adopting this heterogenous concept of organism and identity in just the way Pradeu
describes, e.g., in describing how monozygous twins’ genomes become more distinctive
over time (Gringras and Chen 2001), and also in thinking about human
microbiomes:
This [genetic and transcriptional] diversity [of the human gut microbiome],
even between genetically identical individuals, provides an expanded view
of our multicellularity and interpersonal genetic variation.
(Turnbaugh et al 2010, 7508)
Other living things identities (e.g., species) will also be diachronic, come in degrees, and
become more pronounced over time, though will lack an immune system, and, thus, a
dimension of uniqueness and individuality. Pradeu argues that it is this distinct
dimension of identity that permits the generation of the highest expression of
individuality, citing three lines of argument: that the heterogeneous organism is a
distinct entity with clearly defined boundaries, is an evolutionary individual, and
controls lower-level variations (p. 255-62). What we are left with is a concept of the
heterogeneous organism, distinctive among biological individuals, that expresses
individuality to the highest degree.
Pradeu convincingly makes the case that the immune system permits the
heterogeneous organism to express individuality in a distinctive way. Yet, other living
things may also express distinctive dimensions of individuality, e.g., species may also be
heterogeneous, though not due to the possession of immune systems (Haber 2012). This
suggests that an argument analogous to Pradeu’s may be available for other kinds of
biological individuals. Namely, as with heterogeneous organisms, other living things
may also express individuality along unique dimensions, and, on these measures,
express it to a higher degree than the heterogeneous organism. So though Pradeu has
made a compelling case that immunological individuals distinctively express
individuality, and may do so to a high degree, if other dimensions of individuality are
available, then which living things express individuality to the highest degree may
depend on how we measure it. Of course, this is merely to suggest an argument, and to
Pradeu’s credit, the onus is on the critic to provide it.
The heterogeneous organism is presented as a direct challenge to the evolutionary
criterion of individuality, which holds that “any entity upon which natural selection
acts” is a biological individual (p. 234 and elsewhere). So (p. 255):
One of the implications of the evolutionary criterion of individuation is that
the organism is only one level of biological individuality among others.
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individuality than any other.
How effective is this challenge? Notice, first, that Pradeu’s target would more precisely
be labeled a levels of selection account. This is certainly a popular account, and
emphasizes how individuals at all levels function as units of selection. Indeed, Wilson
and Sober (1989) exploit just this feature to defend multilevel selection (as do others,
e.g., Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2009). This emphasis, though, can come at the
expense of recognizing what makes individuals at different levels distinct. Pradeu’s
goal is not to show that this stance is wrong or not useful, but to enrich it. The
heterogeneous organism demonstrates the narrowness of the levels of selection framing,
and how a richer evolutionary account is available by bringing physiological and
developmental perspectives to bear on individuality.
I think Pradeu is right, both in his critique of the levels of selection approach being too
narrow, and that a more inclusive account of individuality will be richer and more
fruitful.4 And though the heterogeneous organism will certainly retain its
distinctiveness, Pradeu’s account of individuality will also generalize in what may be
surprising ways—perhaps even in concordance with other more expansive treatments
of biological individuality (e.g., from the systematics literature). These connections and
consequences deserve to be explored in much more detail, but I suspect what we will
find are, for example, ranking versus grouping debates about organisms analogous to
those concerning higher taxa (e.g., Mishler and Brandon 1987), eliminativist accounts
that hold the immunological organism up as the standard bearer for disambiguating the
term ‘organism’, and a development of how degrees of individuality might be
distinctively expressed across the biological scale.
Overall, the book is carefully written, well argued, deeply compelling, relevant and
interesting. It is also difficult; Pradeu needs the details of immunology readily laid out
in order to drive his argument, and this can be a challenge for those unfamiliar with
recent developments in that field. Yet the reader will be rewarded for their work. The
presentation is clear and accessible, without sacrificing precision.
When I invited people to join a reading group for this book, the biologist Fred Adler
sent this reply: “This sounds like complete madness, and yet, somehow, fascinating.”5 I
took this to be (since confirmed) high praise of the project. It was also reminiscent of
what Frédéric Bouchard once described to me as one of his favorite things about being a
philosopher of biology, that we get to explore conceptual space that, for a myriad of
reasons, biologists don’t. Sometimes we discover things there that turn out to be of
great value, and draw the attention of biologists in the process. Pradeu has done just
this here. He takes on a highly ambitious project, and largely hits the mark. It is an
4Using a very different argument, I draw a very similar conclusion in my 2013.
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outstanding book, one I can wholeheartedly recommend.
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